



OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTIES AS
WITNESSES.
"The Law that is the perfection of reason, cannot suffer any thing that is incon-
venien."-CoKE.
" Truth, which only doth judge itself, teacbetli, that the inquiry of truth, which
is the love making or wooing of it; the knowledge of truth, which is the presence
of it; and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it; is the sovereign good of
human nature."-BAcox.
No rule of evidence is better settled than that which excludes
parties from being witnesses in their own suit. All the writers,
from Baron Gilbert down to Greenleaf, agree in saying that any
immediate legal interest in the event of an action renders the
interested party incompetent as a witness in that action.
"When a man," says Gilbert, the first writer on evidence, who
flourished about the time of Queen Anne's reign, "who is interested
in the matter in question, comes to prove it, it is rather a ground
for distrust than any just cause for belief; for men are generally so
short-sighted as to look at their own private benefit, which is near
to them, rather than to the good of the world, which is more remote;
1 1 Gilb. Ev. 224.
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therefore, from the nature of human passions and actions, there is
more reason to distrust such a biased testimony than to believe it.
It is also easy for persons who are prejudiced and prepossessed, to
put false and unequal glosses upon what they give in evidence; and
therefore the law removes them from testimony, to prevent their
sliding into perjury; and it can be no injury to truth to remove
those from the jury, whose testimony may hurt themselves, and can
never induce any rational belief."
The only writer who entertains any doubt as to the soundness of
this doctrine, is Jeremy Bentham, in whose work on "Judicial
Evidence" may be found a long and able discussion of the question,
taking the position that the regulation is against nature and sound
sense.
It is also a rule of the common law, that no party to a suit shall
be compelled to give testimony for the opposite party.
Both these rules seem to have sprung from the civil law. The
cardinal maxims of the Roman jurists upon this subject, were:
"1 Yullus idoneus testis in re sua intelligitur ;" "Omnibus in re Pro-
pria dicendi testimonii fucultatem jura submoverunt ;" " .Aremo
tenetur seipsum prodere."
It is our object to examine the grounds of these rules, and to
inquire whether they are founded in justice; and, more particularly,
to investigate the propriety of the exclusion of parties as witnesses
in their own suits at law.
We must not suppose, however, that those arbitrary rules have
always had sway. In the earliest times, before the humanizing
influences of Christianity and civilization had dawned upon the world,
the settlement of litigations was a matter of comparatively small
importance, and the simplest means were taken to dispose of these
troubles6me affairs. If one man fancied that he had sustained an
injury from another, the parties, by mutual consent, went before
the sovereign of the country, the governor, the judge, appointed to
hear and decide such questions, or even some disinterested neighbor;
they told their respective stories, the arbitrator decided between
them; and by his decision the parties were in law and in honor
bound to abide. In those days, the scales of justice were unencum-
bered with the infinitesimal small weights of modern rules of evidence.
DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTIES AS WITNESSES.
But as men became more refined, and as the arts and trades
increased in value and importance, and as Commerce extended her
white wings over the ocean, and as the barbarities of war were
softened, and as nations grew to regard each other in more friendly
aspects, it would seem as if man's faith in man grew less in geometri-
cal proportion. It would seem as if when man grew rich, he became
dishonorable; as if when he became civilized, his word could no
longer be trusted; as if when he received Christianity, he became
more exposed to the temptations of perjury; in short, it would seem
as if the human race, instead of growing in wisdom and virtue, had
degenerated into iniquity, and that all the advantages and privileges
which we possess over our ancestors, have only sufficed to make us
their inferiors in honesty. The restraints of technical rules have
been thrown up as barriers against the admission of parties on their
own behalf in suits at law. The simplicity, brevity, and we may
say, the equity, of legal proceedings, have beenin a manner destroyed.
The individuals who were once considered the most natural and
proper witnesses to prove the charge of the parties, are now rejected
as the most dangerous and unreliable, and their testimony is scrupu-
lously shut out. The only persons who knew all the facts and
circumstances connected with the subject matter of a law suit, are
now the only persons who are not competent witnesses in that suit.
The only conceivable objection that can be urged against a repeal
of these rules, is the pretended inducement to the commission of
perjury that it would afford. And yet as things now stand, a wicked.
or designing man can easily accomplish his purposes by the suborn-
ation of perjury. A man who will himself swear falsely, can
generally find others who will do the same thing, and thus he may
accomplish his end indirectly, and that without rendering himself
liable to the same danger of exposure that would be attendant upon
false swearing. So great has this evil become, that the same punish-
ment is now inflicted upon the perjurer and the suborner of perjury.
Again, there are numeious cases in which the law is forced to
waive these rules, from motives of necessity, or of public policy, as
the writers on evidence say. There are many instances in which a
man may be his own witness; as where the party against whom the
oath is offered has been guilty of some fraud, or of some tortious
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and unwarrantable act of intermeddling witli the complainant's
goods ;' in many cases of bailment, as to prove the contents of a
trunk lost during transportation by a common carrier.2  A party
may become a witness to prove the loss of a deed or other paper,
preparatory to the offering of secondary evidence to show its con-
tents. 3 So, to procure a continuance of a suit, in order to obtain
testimony.4 Also, to prove entries in books, under certain circum-
stances.5 So, too, his affidavits are admissible to establish the
materiality of a witness; to show diligent search for a witness, and
in some other instances preparatory to and attendant upon the trial
of an action.' The answer of a defendant in equity, so far as it is
responsive to the bill, is admitted as evidence in his favor as well as
against him.7 The oath of an inventor, made prior to the issuing
of letters patent, that he was the first and true inventor, may be
opposed, in a question concerning originality of the invention, to
the testimony of witnesses produced to prove that the invention was
not original." In an action of malicious prosecution for causing the
defendant to be indicted, proof of the evidence given by the defen-
dant on the trial of the indictment, is admissible to show probable
cause.9 An account of sale rendered by a consignee is sometimes
evidence in his favor against the consignor." In some States, in a
defence of usury, the defendant may be sworn to prove the usurious
transaction.i
In actions of a criminal nature, the same exceptions are made,
from the same motives. It may perhaps be contended that in these
cases the complainant can have no interest. It is often true that
he may have no immediate pecuniary interest, hut where that is
lacking he may have a moral interest, entirely paramount to any
paltry consideration of gain or loss. Thus, one who has been rob-
bed or assaulted, may, by his own oath, prove the robbery or
assault.'? In proceeding under the filiation laws, the mother of a
I 1 Tait on Ev. 280. 2 1 Green]. R. 27.
3 1 Peters, 591. 1 Greenl. Ev. 349.
5 12 Mete. 44. 6 1 Greenl. Ev. 349.
7 9 Cranch, 160. 8 1 Story, 336.
9 6 Mod. 216. to 4 Cranch, 163.
1 R. S. Mass., c. 55, 4; Maine, c. 69, 3; Kentucky, c. 37, art. 2, 38.
I- 1 Bull. N. P. 187, 289.
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-bastard may always swear as to the paternity of her child.1 In
-actions of a qui tam nature, the complainant may always be a
competent witness on behalf of the people.2 And this is an instance
where the witness has a pecuniary, as well as a moral, interest; for
often the establishment of his claim to receive part of the fine may
depend altogether upon his own oath. In an action for rape the
complainant is a competent, and generally, the only witness for the
prosecution. 3 And as regards this last class of cases, it seems to us
that an application of Sancho Panza's rule might be generally con-
ducive to the development of truth. That immortal personage,
during his gubernatorial dignity, when a woman came before him,
complaining that a rape had been committed upon her person by
the prisoner, asked her if she had any money about her? On
receiving an affirmative answer, he commanded the defendant to
take it away. After a long and desperate struggle, the man acknow-
ledged to the governor that he was unable to do it. "Go, woman,"
said the sage; 1 hadst thou been as careful of thy chastity as thou
art of thy money, thou wouldst never have lost it !"
The maxim, "' em o tenetur seipsum prodere," also, is not univer-
sally applied, as an extract from Greenleaf will show :
"In some cases at law, and generally by the course of proceed-
ings in equity, one party may appeal to the conscience of the other,
by calling him to answer interrogatories upon oath. But this act
of the advcrsary may be regarded as an empLatic admission, that,
in that instance, the party is wortlhy of credit, and that his known
integrity is a sufficient guaranty against the danger of falsehood.''
Other instances might be cited in which the law has abated its
rigor in respect to the exclusion of the parties from testifying, but
we have already quoted enough to establish the fact. The law,
therefore, plainly admits, that in many cases the enforcing of these
rules would occasion great inconvenience, and often'a total failure
of justice. But if the principle is right, no exception should be
allowed. It either is, or'is not, right. If it is right and equitable,
not even the smallest departure from it should be tolerated by courts.
I1 Green]. Ev. p. 463, note 4.
3 Grecnl. Ev. 212.
2 16 Peters, 203.
' I Greenl. Ev. 329.
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It should be strictly carried into effect, and if occasional injustice
should thereby be done, still, the inconvenience should be borne,
with the reflection that the smaller evils which might arise from its
enforcement must in the end be less oppressive than the greater
ones which would certainly be consequent upon its relaxation.
Every departure from a recognized and established rule or principle
of law, necessarily weakens its authority, and subjects it to the
criticising of those interested in the administration of justice.
Most of the received maxims of evidence are simple, just, and incon-
trovertible; they have withstood the assault of ages, and have been
embellished and illustrated by the dicta of judges and the learning
of sages. But the rule under present consideration seems to us
unjust, inconsistent, and impracticable. It has worked much injury
in past times to the rights of deserving men, and has retarded the
due course of justice in a greater degree than any other canon to be
found in the books.
We propose to consider briefly some advantages which would
arise from its repeal.
In the first place, then, we claim that its repeal would promote
the elucidation of truth in our courts. The principal ground of
belief is faith in human testimony. There is of necessity more
truth than falsehood in the world. If it were otherwise, we should
be unable to place any reliance upon the commonest representations
of everyday life. There are, it is to be feared, many who "love
and make a lie ;" but the number of those who would commit delibe-
rate perjury, is probably, in comparison with that of the truthful, no
greater than the number of convicts in our State prisons, compared
with the great mass of sober and industrious and upright citizens.
But it may be said that this is not a fair comparison; there are
many rascals still at large. We answer, that there are many inno-
cent persons in confinement. As every individual at large in the
world is not pure, so every person in our penetentiaries is not vile.
The probability is, that ninety-nine out of every one hundred plain-
tiffs and defendants would tell the truth if put upon the witness
stand.
Again, how inconsistent is, sometimes, the working of the rule
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which we are considering. We can conceive of a man, pure and
unblemished in reputation, of sober and regular habits, of disin-
terested benevolence, of high moral aims, of elevated philanthropy;
one whose good deeds are in every man's mouth; one whom the world
honors, whom God loves, and whom even villains respect. We can
also conceive of another man, sunk and steeped in vice and crime;
a gambler, a libertine, a blasphemer; one whose "conscience is
seared as if with a hot iron ;" whose moral sense is blunted by
wickedness; one who is despised by his fellows, and whose existence
is an offence in the eyes of his Maker. We may suppose these two
men to know precisely the same state of facts in reference to a
litigation. The former, if he has the interest of two shillings in the
event of the suit, cannot open his mouth in court; but the latter,
because he has no pecuniary interest, is a competent witness, and
his evidence goes to the jury. The former is excluded through fear
of his "sliding into perjury ;" but the latter, who perhaps, has not
spoken the truth within the memory of men now living, is freely
admitted.
A repeal of this rule would tend to the elucidation of truth; first,
because the parties who, alone of all men, have a full and complete
knowledge of the transactions in dispute, would be confronted and
sworn, and their stories compared and weighed by twelve disin-
terested men. How many a cause has been lost for the want of
proof of a fact which lay in the knowledge of one of the parties
alone! There is no remedy in such a case. Justice is misled.
According to old Baron Gilbert's doctrine, such an anomaly as an
honest law suit was never known; for he says: "It is not to be
presumed that a man who complains without cause,or defends with-
out justice, should have honesty enough to confess it."'  But in our
times a more enlightened belief is inevitable.
Again, the parties would be subject to the same tests as ordinary
witnesses. They would take the same oath-an awful and solemn
promise before God and man. They would submit to the same
cross-examination-at once the most perfect and effectual system
for the unraveling of falsehood ever devised by the ingenuity of
I 1 Glib. Ev. 243.
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mortals. The minutest circumstance, the smallest fact would be
forced upon the mind of such a witness. There could be no escape
from the vigorous sifting of his testimony. If he is refractory, he
will be met by a determination equal to his own. If he is equivocal,
he will be pushed to the wall, and made to declare himself explicitly.
Conscious that everything depends upon his own story and appear-
ance, he will be scrupulous in his statements, not deviating from the
exact truth. His voice, his eyes, his manner, will be remarked and
commented on by the jury. If in spite of all these guards, he lies
successfully, he must be a shrewder man than most of his fellows;
for he must not only deceive the opposing counsel, but the judge on
his bench and the jury in their box.
Another advantage which would flow from the reform proposed,
would be discoverable in the shortening of law suits, and the simpli-
fication of questions of evidence. It is notorious that our laws are
tardy in their operation. It takes one-tenth of the active business
community all the time to try the law suits of the rest. This is a
moderate estimate, if we consider the time occupied in our courts
references, and arbitrations, by parties, witnesses, judges, juries,
and counsel. At our circuits, it is seldom that more than one suit
is daily disposed of, on the average. [Our judges of the Supreme
Court in this State' long ago discovered this, and recently passed a
rule requiring counsel to stand, and to refrain from taking notes
while examining witnesses. This was a reform, but not the reform.
It does not answer the object sought.] So long as parties arc shut
out as witnesses, -so long our litigations will be tedious. An incalcu-
lable amount of extraneous and cumulative testimony is now admit-
ted, and hours are consumed at the circuits in arguing nice, and
difficult questions of evidence, which owe their rise and existence
entirely to the present state of things. If the law were changed in
this respect, in many cases no other testimony than that of the
parties would be necessary; the labors of counsel and judges would
be lightened, jurymen would not be kept away from their employ-
ments; the cause of truth would be advanced, and all parties would
be better satisfied with a litigation free from the burdens of our
present system, and equally answering it in every desirable respect.
' New York.
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Lawyers would have an increase of business, for more suits would
be brought; and with this triple appeal to head, heart, and pocket,
we may hope to obtain their influence in accomplishing this most
desirable of all legal reforms. Much of the stigma which is now
thrown upon our profession by the mass, would be removed. We
should no longer have the reputation of obstructing the course of
justice to fill our own coffers, and our clients would pay our reason-
able demands with a better grace. There could no longer be any
semblance of reason in the saying of Cornelius Agrippa, that, "the
calling of advocates is to prevent equity."
Wre rejoice to see that the spirit of reform is at work, and that
many important movements have been made towards bringing about
this desirable object. It is an innovation upon old established and
honored customs, and like all other reforms, must be gradual. "Re-
formers, generally, have to draw upon posterity for their reward."'
But, says Lord Bacon, "surely every medicine is an innovation,
and he that will not apply new remedies, must expect new evils;
for time is the greatest innovator; and if time, of course, alter things
to the worse, and wisdom and counsel shall not alter them to the
better, what shall be the end ? "2 There are many prejudices to
be overcome before a way can be clear for our design.
The initiate step in this matter was taken in England, in 1844,
by the passage of "Lord Denman's Act," by which all disqualifica-
tions of witnesses, by reason of any interest in the event of the
suit, were Iemoved. The same enactment was adopted in our Stain
by the code of procedure. 3 Neither of these statutes, however,
goes the length of allowing a party to testify in his own behalf. Ia
several States any party may compel his adversary to testify. In
Mfichigan this can be done, but the applicant must first make affida-
vit that the desired testimony is material, and known to the adverse
party, and that there is no other means of obtaining it.4 In New
York the adverse party may be called as a witness, and may testify
in his own behalf, as to the.matter in regard to which he is exam-
' Judge Edmond's address on the Code of Procedure, 1848.
2 Bacon's Essay on "Innovations." New York Code .98.
4 R. S. 1840, c. 102, 100.
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ined in chief; and if he testifies to any new matter, the party call-
ing him may also testify to such new matter.' This is considered a
great step in the right path, and is a good indication of the spirit
of our legislators. The law is precisely the same in Wisconsin.
2
In Missouri, parties may summon each other as witnesses in justice's
courts, and if the party summoned refuse to appear or testify, the
other may give his oath in litem.3  In Massachusetts, the parties
in civil actions may require of each other, upon written interroga-
tories, the discovery upon oath of any facts or documents material
to the support or defence of the action; but neither party is bound
to make any disclosure tending to criminate himself, or to discover
his title to any other property not material to the issue, or to dis-
close the names of his own witnesses, or the intended mode of pros-
ing his case. 4 But it was left to the State of Connecticut to com-
plete this great reform, and to set an example to her sister States
and the world. It is somewhat singular that this little common-
wealth, where a century ago it was unlawful for a man to kiss his
wife on Sunday, or to drive to church in a gig, should be the first
to adopt this most liberal doctrine. This is now the settled law of
that State, as appears from the following enactment :-" No per-
son shall be disqualified as a witness in any suit or proceeding at
law or in equity, by reason of his interest in the event of the same,
as a party or otherwise, or by reason of his conviction of a crime ;
but such interest or conviction may be shown for the purpose of
affecting his credit." r By a subsequent statute this enactment was
confined to civif actions. The same provision was enacted in Ohio,
in 1853, with the exception, that where one party is an executor or
administrator of a deceased person, and the subject of the suit con-
cerns matter originating in the lifetime of that person, the other
party cannot be sworn as a witness therein.6
These instances are sufficient to show that the current of opinion
in this country and in England is favorable to throwing aside all
the old disqualifications of interest.
I New York Code, P 395. 2 R. S. 1849, c. 98, Sec. 57-60. 3 R. S. a. 93, J 24-25.
4 R. S. 1851, e. 233, P 98, 106-R. S. 1852, a. 812, P 61-69.
-'r. S. 18J-, p. 95, Pg 141-142. 6 R. S. 1854, c. 87, tit. 10, 310.
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No reform can be nearer to the heart, or more especially com-
mend itself to the right reason of every high-minded and intelli-
gent lawyer. It has for its object the simplification of legal pro-
ceedings, the advancement of truth, and the good of mankind. We
do not despair of seeing it adopted all over this land during our life-
time. Greater reforms, even, than this, have been effected almost in-
stantaneously. Once, a man indicted for felony in England, was not
allowed to have any counsel, but was dependent upon the mercy of
his judge. Once, a criminal was hung for stealing sixpence. Once,
confessions were wrung out of unwilling lips, on the rack. These
abuses have been banished from our criminal codes, and now is pro-
posed a reform equally important to the interests of suitors in civil
actions. It is proposed to clear our common law of a maxim whose
effect is to defeat justice, and which presupposes that there is no
honesty in the human race. It is proposed to let every man, good
or bad, speak freely in our courts, and to submit the task of de-
ciding between the adverse parties, to a jury fully conversant with
every fact in each case. It is one of our boasts that we have the
privilege of submitting our disputes to the arbitration of a jury of
our peers. Let it also be bur boast that we can stand up in open
court, and under the sanction of an solemn oath, tell our grievances
freely, and without fear of reproach. Where juries are now in the
dark, and grope blindly after truth, they will be enabled to see the
truth face to face ; and where justice was once dimly guessed at, it
will be grasped with certainty, and brought palpably to view. Those
who would otherwise be debarred from prosecuting their just de-
mands, will have opportunity to present their claims for adjudica-
tion. The effect of the whole will be, instead of promoting perjury,
to force men to become more honest; for where a contract is made,
each will be upon his guard, knowing that at any moment his adver-
sary may step forward, and expose any attempt at iniquity or
fraud.
We hope to see the time when not only all these restrictions as to
parties shall be abolished, but when every person, however infa-
mous, may be a competent witness; when no peculiar form of reli-
